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In the early 20th century, landless peasants from the densely populated regions of deltaic Bengal moved into the relatively thinly inhabited Darrang district in the Brahmaputra valley 
with a song and a slogan: ‘Chal, chal, Darrang chal/jangal 
bhangia abad kar/patit mati dakhal kar’.1 This movement of peo-
ple involved social networks, new power relations involving colo-
nial authorities, settlers, planters and native inhabitants in a 
manner that profoundly changed the politics and history of one 
corner of the sub-continent. In an uncanny repetition of this 
rhythm, modern Pakistanis wanting to find riches in the Gulf 
countries have their own version of the Darrang song that is 
acknowledged as the ‘Dubai chalo’ (Let’s go to Dubai) syndrome. 
The patterns of migrations and their meanings vary across the 
sub-continent, motivations ranging from aspirations for upward 
mobility to escape from socio-economic or political distress situa-
tions. There are parallels and differences in this narrative of 
mobility in south Asia that need to be addressed as part of the 
transformation of migration practices and strategies in modern 
times. Today, with south Asia being a site of concern for security 
agencies as well as being the locus of an extensive migration that 
links cities and villages in the region to diverse places like Kuala 
Lumpur, Dubai and London, there is a need to retell the stories of 
migration that cuts through concerns of governments, policy-
makers and migrants themselves.
patterns and politics of Migration 
Role of Remittances: Migration has increasingly appeared as an 
important theme in national politics in south Asian countries for 
a variety of reasons. It has raised fundamental questions of how 
societies and states have handled mobility and the political, 
economic and cultural reactions that they have engendered. On 
the brighter side, much of the region has benefited from remit-
tances that migrants have sent to the home countries.
Figures 1 to 4 (p 58) highlight remittances as the second-most 
important source of external funding for the four south Asian 
countries Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. With remit-
tances of $ 200 billion, India was ahead of all other countries that 
also receive huge financial transfers from migrants [Figure 2; 
World Bank 2006; Zachariah and Rajan 2006]. According to 
World Bank estimates, they have been exponentially growing 
from $ 0.08 million in 1970 to $ 2.8 billion in 1980, $ 3.4 billion in 
1991, about 11.7 billion in 2000 and $ 20 billion in 2004 [World 
Bank 2006]. Recent studies in Nepal show that there are more 
than a million migrants out of a total population of some 28 
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million who live away from their homes and send back remit-
tances to the tune of approximately $ 604 million. This sum 
nearly doubles the total foreign aid to Nepal [Figure 3; Kollmair 
et al 2006; CBS et al 2004; Graner and Seddon 2004].2 These 
numbers highlight that labour migration and the associ-
ated remittances are the mainstay of Nepal’s economy. The 
amount of money annually remitted per person varies according 
to the migrant’s country of destination. Case studies indicate that 
a Nepali migrant in India remits an average of $ 124 (9,000 NRs) 
per year, whereas migrants to the western countries are able to send 
an annual average of $ 6,177 (4,50,000 NRs) [Kollmair et al 2006].
South Asian countries have been perceptive to the role of 
remittances in the national economies. Countries such as Bangladesh 
have constituted separate ministries for the welfare of its migrant 
community overseas. The Ministry 
of Expatriate Welfare and Overseas 
Employment (MEWOE) is entrusted 
with protecting the rights and in-
terests of Bangladeshi migrants in 
the host country; ensuring welfare 
of remittance senders; facilitating 
overseas employment for prospec-
tive Bangladeshi migrants and in-
creasing their resource capabilities 
and enhancing the skills of the 
labour force [IOM 2006: 219]. The 
country also has other formal 
recruiting agencies that are regu-
lated by the government. Such an 
acknowledgement of the role of 
remittances in the economy of the 
country is not surprising, given the 
extent of migration from Bangla-
desh to destinations as diverse as 
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Europe 
and the US. These remittances 
have a significant impact on the 
national economy and have con-
tributed more than 4 per cent to 
the country’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) and helped bolster a 
sluggish local economy [IOM ibid]. 
Within states, regional econo-
mies display different degrees of 
dependence on overseas workers’ 
savings. The highlands of Paki-
stan’s North-West Frontier Pro-
vince (NWFP) as well as the part of 
Jammu and Kashmir under Paki-
stani administration can plausibly 
be called remittance economies. 
Similar to them, the federal unit of 
Kerala in India is heavily depend-
ent in its worker remittances from 
the Gulf countries. The signifi-
cance of the foreign remittances to 
the state economy has been evocatively put by Zachariah and 
Rajan (2006) that it has been seven times of what the state received 
from the government of India as budget support, 1.6 times the 
state’s annual government expenditure in 2004 and 1.7 times its 
revenue receipts.
Other sides of Migration
The linkages between international and internal migrations are 
clearly manifested in Kerala. Concomitant to the massive outflow 
of workers from Kerala, mostly to the Gulf, in response to the 
labour shortage that has emerged in this state, a large inflow of 
migrant labour from other parts of India to Kerala has occurred, 
creating different labour circuits. The in-migration to fill the gaps 
left by migrants to the Gulf has been continuing, motivated by 
the higher agricultural and non-
agricultural wages in Kerala, com-
pared to other states in India. Simi-
larly, factors like agrarian distress 
have prompted labour migrations 
from highland districts to other 
districts of Kerala and to neigh-
bouring states like Karnataka. 
That distress-induced migrations 
are mostly to destinations that do 
not require official paper work and 
bureaucratic hurdles to be over-
come or those involving much 
waiting period, skills and capabili-
ties or much initial investments is 
only natural. Whereas 75 per cent 
of remittances to Nepal come from 
migrants to the west and Gulf 
countries, more than three-fourths 
of the migrants take off to India – a 
journey which does entail the 
costly requirement of a visa.
However, an analysis taking dif-
ferent levels into account reveals 
ambiguities. Whereas remittances 
undoubtedly contribute to filling 
the national exchequer with for-
eign exchange, the economic role 
of migration at the individual and 
household level is more blurry. The 
positive role of remittances for 
poverty reduction has been high-
lighted across the region [Siddiqui 
and Kemal 2003; Gazdar 1999; 
Bhattacharya and Deb 2006]. In 
rural communities with little cash 
income, even small transfers of 
cash are highly valued as they re-
duce the risks of harvest failure 
and food shortages. Aspects other 
than financial returns – such as 
sending material goods – have also 
Figure 1: remittances, Foreign Direct investment, exports and Official 
Development aid Flows to Bangladesh (2000-04, million $)
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Figure 2: remittances, FDi, exports and ODa Flows to india (2000-04, million $)
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to be considered. For Nepali migrants and their families, having 
family members in India assures access to medical treatment and 
education in the host country. Moreover, the absence of a person 
also means that the food requirements of the household are 
reduced. On the other hand, it is often the regions where land and 
employment are scarce and poverty abundant that become major 
sending regions of labour migration. The mountainous district of 
Pakistan’s NWFP bordering Afghanistan is a case in point. There 
are attendant problems with Bangladesh’s above-mentioned 
acknowledgement of the positive contribution of remittances. 
Frequent stories of maltreatment of Bangladeshi migrants in host 
countries and exploitation during the recruiting process are part 
of the seamier narrative of the remittance economy in Bangladesh.
Looking into the more dynamic issues of vulnerability, Suleri 
and Savage (2006) highlight the fact that households’ remit-
tances were less vulnerable to the effects of the earthquake catastro-
phe that hit NWFP as well as Kashmir, on both sides of the India-
Pakistan border, in October 2005. Individuals had used the cash 
remitted by household members to stabilise their houses. The 
severity of the tremors turned their neighbours’ houses (constructed 
with stone or mud) into rubble, a larger portion of the cement 
mortar houses in the migrant-sending families withstood the 
quake. In addition, their ability to cope with the disaster’s effects 
was strengthened by their improved access to cash as compared 
to others whose livelihoods were dependent on subsistence agri-
culture. In the same region, however, the remittance economy of 
rural NWFP has created vulnerabilities of its own. Siegmann and 
Steimann (2005) find irregular remittances to represent one of 
the major financial crises for households in rural NWFP. 
Distress migrations leading to further distress is also not 
uncommon. Generally, Nepali migrants going to India possess 
limited financial means and are not well-educated. The job mar-
kets in India are highly organised and there are networks that 
“sell” jobs. For their financial needs, migrants establish their own 
informal savings and credit associations. However, they do not 
learn new skills, incur even greater debts due to poorly run finan-
cial self-help groups and gambling and deal with poor working 
conditions. Low education levels, informal work routines and 
lack of access to social networks can, at times, conspire against 
Nepali migrants in India [Thieme 2006]. Many women migrants 
who move outside their home territories for domestic labour, 
home nursing or for agricultural or non-agricultural labour have 
insecure working and living arrangements that threaten their 
personal safety.
The darker side of this migration is, thus, that it is often fuelled 
by poverty, political uncertainties and violence. The movement 
of refugees fleeing from conflicts in Sri Lanka (to India) and 
Afghanistan (to Pakistan); forced eviction of Nepali-speaking 
citizens from Bhutan (to Nepal); forced migration of Muslim 
Rohingiya from Burma (Myanmar) (to Bangladesh); and periodic 
migrations due to conflict of ethnic minorities like Nagas and 
Chins from Burma (to north-east India) are part of the inter-
national dynamic of conflict-induced migration in south Asia. 
Figure 3 illustrates that search for employment abroad paralleled 
the drop in external trade and FDI in Nepal due to the civil war of 
the past years. There is, of course, the phenomenon of internally 
and forced displacement of persons within south Asian countries 
that needs special mention. 
political economy of colonial Frontiers
The roots of this story lie (in great part) in the changes in political 
and geographical realities brought about by European coloni-
sation of the sub-continent and the subsequent formation of 
modern states in region. The 20th century has witnessed auda-
cious cartographic exercises that resulted in demarcation of 
national territories and spaces. However, this exercise was car-
ried out on a terrain that was for most part not easy to map, such 
as the Bengal and Assam borderlands and the eastern Himalayan 
region or the mountainous border regions that separate Pakistan 
from India as well as Afghanistan.
This resulted in the transformation of ambiguous frontiers into 
national boundaries within which populations were subjected to 
different policies regulating identities, livelihoods and mobility 
[van Schendel 2005; Hutt 2003]. Cartographic solutions of post-
colonial countries have also transformed the language of citizen-
ship. In a sense, each state in the south Asian region has to regu-
late the movement of people from territories that are at once 
contiguous and porous. Such transformations are of immense 
importance as they help one understand the international, 
domestic and sub-regional politics that accompany migration 
issues. Migration thus forces one to reconsider the given cate-
gories of space and identity. They form a crucial element in what 
Roger Rouse calls “a world of crisscrossed economies, intersected 
systems of meaning and fragmented identities” that challenge 
the notions of centre and periphery of citizenship and nationality 
[Rouse 1991: 8-9]. One understands that national borders are 
seen as zones of control and the need for security is paramount to 
such a view. Increasingly, non-state actors and civil society or-
ganisations have also begun to view cross-border migration as a 
threat and a security issue.3 
However, population flows between and within states are  as 
much a result of a lack of human security arising out of armed 
conflicts and natural disasters, as they are concerns for states 
who see population movements as a cause for security legisla-
tion and regulation. The recent proposal to fence, or even mine, 
the mountain regions that separate Pakistan and Afghanistan 
as a part of the so-called “war on terror” by the Pakistani 
government provides an extreme example of security-driven 
policy to curb mobility. This securitisation of migration is ex-
perienced in Bangladesh and India as well. Studies conducted 
in Bangladesh show that it is the state that is the main actor in 
securitising migration [Siddiqui, nd]. These studies claim that 
in the case of migration from Bangladesh to India, right-wing 
governments and their non-state agents in India and sections 
of the media have been pushing for a more security-oriented 
approach to fence the border between India and Bangladesh. 
The study also concludes that migrants are not a security threat 
to the receiving countries and securitising agents’ efforts to 
criminalise migration have a different set of concerns that have 
more to do with military concerns. Indeed, the overarching 
narrative of being engulfed by countless numbers of Bangladeshi 
immigrants has been one of the underlying factors in the frequent 
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eruptions of violence (by indigenous communities) against 
settlers in north-east India. 
Sanjib Baruah, while speaking in the context of why such cases 
of internal and forced displacement occur in north-east India, 
says that they are an outcome of transformation of frontiers that 
were created in the 19th and 20th centuries [Baruah 2005]. 
According to him, the process of creating frontiers also meant the 
sequestering of people and territories within a particular time 
and space. Modern states and laws have continued to rely on 
colonial legislation for regulating the flows of people and one of 
the outcomes of the continuance (of such legislation) has been 
the hardening of identities in resource-conflicts. A recent news 
report from the border along India’s north-eastern state of Tripura 
and Bangladesh, quoting security personnel, claimed that the 
construction of a barbed wire fence along the porous border has 
increased the sense of security among many Indian citizens 
because it has stopped theft and smuggling from across the 
border [Das, P 2007]. 
The report further complicates the security narrative by 
quoting villagers who find their farm lands, fishing ponds and 
common property lodged in a proverbial no-man’s-land. The 
second narrative is muted in the report, as in public discourse. 
The emphasis, as always, has been on national security and rais-
ing divergent views that allude to livelihoods is threatening. It is 
the dissembling of such issues of identity that make borders the 
symbols opposed to mobility. Unless those whose lives are threat-
ened by borders begin to internalise the metaphoric fence, they 
are seen as suspects by those in authority.4 This is something that 
resonates with creating and maintaining land borders across the 
breadth of south Asia. Increasingly, there is a tendency to 
perceive borders as normal while discounting the perspectives of 
those whose histories are entwined in the space now referred to 
as borders.
The phenomenon of internal forced migration has also been 
subjected to critical inquiry within the south Asian context. Some 
of this migration is linked to conflict, while much of it is linked to 
developmental strategies pursued by south Asian states [Baner-
jee, Ray-Chaudhury and Das 2005: 13-29]. Conflict-induced inter-
nal forced migration has taken place in almost all the states in 
south Asia. This has to do with the manner in which ethnic com-
munities have been forced to negotiate with territorial arrange-
ments in different states. Within the federal units of India’s 
north-eastern states, ethnic communities often vie with one 
another for territorial reorganisation of the existing federal units. 
The claims for exclusive homelands have resulted in large-scale 
conflict and displacement of people [Das, S 2005: 113-43]. To 
compound the vulnerabilities of a relatively large mass of 
humanity that are internally displaced is the fact that the areas 
where such processes take place are also highly militarised. The 
sustained deployment of government forces, violent activities of 
armed ethnic militia and lack of constitutional safeguards for in-
digenous communities have made India’s north-east a hub for 
conflict-induced forced migration within the territorial borders 
of India [Bhaumik 2005: 144-74].
The other important factor leading to massive internal forced 
migration is developmental projects. South Asian countries like 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have embarked on a modernis-
ing drive towards industrialisation since the 1950s. In the course 
of this drive, the western, technology driven models, where the 
GDP was seen as the sole criteria of development, was taken for 
granted by governments of different countries [Fernandes and 
Ganguly Thukral 1989: 2-10]. Clearly, the vulnerable sections of 
society like indigenous peoples and subsistence farmers were at 
the receiving end of such strategies and their lack of political and 
social capital allowed for instances of population transfers that 
are of tragic dimension. The case of the Chakma refugees from 
Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts region illuminates the vicis-
situdes that continue to impact on their lives today. Forced out of 
their farms and homesteads by the Pakistan government’s decision 
to build the Kaptai dam on its erstwhile Eastern Sector (now 
Bangladesh) in the 1960s, the Chakma people were rendered 
homeless and were forced across the border into north-east 
India. Many then took refuge, or were allowed to settle, in two 
districts of India’s North Eastern Frontier Agency (now Arunachal 
Pradesh). Several generations later, the descendants of the 
Chakma migrants from the Kaptai dam area continue to raise 
the political ante in the state of Arunchal Pradesh every time 
they ask for the state government to endorse their status as 
citizens of India.5
spatial and social Mobility
However, this is not to suggest that migration only leads to con-
flict in the political and social lives of different societies in south 
Asia. There are also unintended consequences of this form of 
mobility that encompasses radical changes in lives of migrants as 
well as the communities that they support back home. In the flow 
of remittances and goods creates conditions for a transformation 
of the areas from where people migrate. In many parts of south 
Asia, migration changing the social spaces available for individu-
als – both widening and shrinking – has been experienced. In 
deeply stratified caste communities, many see migration as a 
means to move away from constraining traditional occupations. 
In south India, migrants from the washer people’s castes in Tamil 
Nadu have occupied a social space in Kerala which is very 
organised and professionalised. They have not inserted them-
selves into caste-stratified social space, but have moved into 
urban residential localities as “mobile ironers” who visit homes 
or stay localised in some specific location with coal and iron in 
push carts. These kin groups iron clothes for the households 
in the streets or localities demarcated for them. They escape 
from the day-to-day caste expectations in their original habitats 
in Tamil Nadu.
Migration, in the patriarchal settings of south Asia, is a gen-
dered process. Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and, until recently, 
Bangladesh have placed various types of restrictions on its female 
population’s ability to migrate legally [Migration Forum in Asia 
2007; IOM 2005; Piper 2005]. A classic example is the current 
debate around the issue of trafficking of women versus safe mig-
ration, especially in Nepal. Those who advocate more stringent 
laws to curtail trafficking of women point towards exploitation 
and sexual violence experienced by poor women from rural 
Nepal. Yet, the issue is not as clearly marked out, as it would 
special article
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  june 14, 2008 61
seem. Powerful non-governmental organisations have begun to 
work together with security agencies – like the local police – in 
order to trace the movement of women (some of who are admit-
tedly very young) from their homes in Nepal, to border areas and 
then to cities in India. This process does not accord agency to 
those who migrate and portrays Nepali women as passive vic-
tims. It also severely underscores the need to have a more holistic 
picture of poverty-induced migration that is somehow linked to 
certain routes for trafficking of human beings.6 This debate is all 
the more contentious because of the different actors involved and 
the eventual positioning of the migrant woman as the eternal vic-
tim, while placing the police and morality arguments of chastity 
above the realities that lead to the woman’s decision to move.
As a result of formal and informal rules that define the appro-
priateness of mobility on the basis of gender, across the region, it 
is often male breadwinners who cross international boundaries 
in search of new livelihood opportunities. This frequently 
induces a restructuring of the gender division of work in the 
sending households. A feminisation of agriculture, resulting from 
male out-migration, is observed in Pakistan [Kazi 1999]. For 
migrants’ wives in the Western Development Region of Nepal, 
Kaspar (2005) finds a mixed bag of increased workload when 
men move to India or the Gulf countries on the one hand and 
more participation in decision-making – even after their husband 
returns – on the other. Also, for the migrating men, their move 
has psycho-social costs apart from the economic benefit that 
motivates their decision to leave home. The “Dubai chalo” slogan 
noted above has also become the label for a socio- 
psychological stress syndrome common amongst Pakistani 
trans-national migrants to the Gulf states. It manifests itself in 
disorientation, resulting from social isolation, culture shock, 
harsh working conditions and the sudden acquisition of relative 
wealth [CIA World Factbook no date]. In contrast to the financial 
flows in the form of remittances, this downside is largely ignored 
in the dominant discourse on migration.
Migration and livelihoods
As the discussion above has illustrated, migration affects multi-
ple aspects of livelihoods and identity rather than financial flows 
alone. In the international academic discourse, the increasing 
mobility and attendant multi-locality described in this paper, 
have been analysed from predominantly two perspectives: First, 
a livelihoods approach perspective, looking mainly at the impact 
of migration on people’s livelihoods; and the second: through 
migration studies, focusing mainly on the process of migration 
represented by the approach of transnational migration and 
concepts of diasporas. 
The livelihoods approach is used to explain the diversity and 
complexity of the ways in which people make a living. It 
addresses the living conditions of poor people, their opportuni-
ties and capacities for well-being, their resilience and their 
resource base composed of various assets [Chambers and 
Conway 1992; de Haan and Rogaly 2002; Köberlein 2003; 
Rakodi and Lloyed-Jones 2002]. 
Livelihood strategies are strongly linked to livelihood assets or 
capitals and these form the heart of the approach. They include 
social, human, financial, natural and physical capital [DFID 2002]. 
These assets are an antidote to a vision of poor people as being 
“passive” or “deprived”. The poor may not have cash or savings 
but they do have other material and non-material assets such as 
family, health, skills and natural resources. To understand these 
assets, one can identify the opportunities they might offer or the 
types of constraints that might exist [Rakodi 2002]. 
The assets poor people possess or have access to, the liveli-
hoods they desire and the strategies they adopt are all influenced 
by the context in which they live. This context has, broadly speak-
ing, two dimensions: the first dimension is an overarching struc-
tural context, including organisations and institutions such as 
rules, norms, policies and legislation shaping livelihoods, where 
three-fourths of the migrants from Nepal still migrate to the visa-
free neighbouring India, despite the fact that work in the Gulf is 
financially much more promising, but requires much more initial 
investment. The second dimension of people’s living context is 
vulnerability. This means the insecurity of people’s well-being in 
the face of a changing ecological, social, political or economic 
environment [Rakodi 2002]. Livelihood strategies can be seen 
as a continuum that covers the range from a struggle to survive, 
security and growth. Livelihood outcomes are the achievements 
or outputs of livelihood strategies. They relate to both increased 
material and non-material well-being such as health, access to 
services and improved resilience to vulnerability, such as food 
security or sustainable use of natural resources [DFID 2002]. 
In recent studies conducted in Bangladesh, the livelihoods 
approach has been used to show how remittances are integral to 
the local economy in the country, but also how such economies 
have their own constraints. These studies show that migration 
has created a situation where sending regions have benefited 
from remittances and the increase in production of certain goods, 
while attracting an inflow of labour from poorer regions. 
However, within the same narratives, one finds that there are 
negative outcomes of migration as well. It leads to local 
inequalities, as shown in Chowdhury’s research in Sylhet, 
where remittances (and by implication, migration) had increased 
the socio-economic differences between families with migrants 
and those without [Chowdhury 1992, 1995].
A livelihoods perspective helps to go beyond a simplistic focus 
on financial flows associated with migration. By integrating non-
material assets in the analysis, for example, the role of education 
and skills as well as social networks for enabling the step outside 
the home comes to the fore. Within such a framework, those 
without the adequate networks to operate in the job market, or 
those without access to legal recourse, are among those power-
less sections of society, whose only recourse to a livelihood – 
somewhat paradoxically – is mobility. Also the dark side of 
migration sketched above, for instance, in the form of poor 
working conditions and abuse of those who leave as well as 
higher workloads of those who stay behind, becomes visible, if a 
fuller set of livelihood resources is considered.
The explicit inclusion of the role of the structural context in 
this conceptual framework reflects the crucial role of the nation 
state and its efforts to regulate and control people’s movements 
richly illustrated by the south Asian examples above. Jointly with 
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the vulnerability context, this integral component of the 
livelihoods approach serves as a reminder that migrants’ 
decisions are more than a result of monetary cost-benefit analyses 
as represented in economistic approaches to migration [Todaro 
1969; Katz and Stark 1986]. As indicated above, wider aspects in 
interpreting migration flows to be considered range from hopes 
for social mobility to forced moves that follow large-scale 
infrastructure development or conflict. However, it has been 
noted that despite the inclusion of structural factors in the 
conceptual framework of the livelihoods approach, it is often 
neglected in applied research [De Haan and Zoomers 2005]. The 
result is a more or less mechanical listing of the capital available 
to the poor and the politically convenient recommendation that 
they may employ these capitals to alleviate their poverty 
themselves [O’Laughlin 2004].
transnational Migration and Diaspora
When analysing the 19th and 20th centuries, migration theory 
relied mainly on the emergence of strong nation states and 
nationalism, viewing a society as a “national container society” 
[Lee 1966]. From this perspective, a certain physical place corre-
sponds to a social space. Consequently, migration was mainly 
seen as uni- or bi-directional movement brought about by emi-
gration, immigration or returns migration and caused by isolated 
factors such as political or economic motivations [Massey et al 
1993; Pries 2001]. However, new information technology and a 
new division of labour are some of the interwoven, yet funda-
mental “global shifts” at work in today’s globalising world [Back-
haus 2003]. Transnational migration has been described as a new 
field emerging at a global level and on a mass scale, mainly due to 
the intensification and the multiplicity of relations between 
countries. To grasp the dynamics of cross-border population 
movement, social anthropologists introduced the concept of 
transnationalism [Glick-Schiller et al 1992, 1999]. As sadly 
illustrated by the “Dubai chalo” syndrome, the people involved, 
live between two worlds: their new migrant communities and 
their home communities. Moreover, these transnational commu-
nities became characterised as deterritorialised and “place-less” 
[Basch et al 1994]. 
Pries (1999, 2001, 2004) developed the concept of transna-
tional migration further, pointing out that the intensity and the 
simultaneity of these cross-border activities led to the emergence 
of transnational social spaces. These are social spaces that have a 
multi-local geographical link rather than an exclusive one. Work, 
housing, life trajectories and time horizons span different locali-
ties in different states [Pries 1999; Pries 2001]. While migrants 
have to adapt to their new environment in their foreign place of 
work, also family members who remain behind have to adapt to 
the new family situation. As pointed out in some cases female 
family members who remained behind challenge patriarchal 
structures, in other cases they do not gain more independence 
and even have to take on bigger workloads and responsibilities 
for house, childcare and land. 
Vertovec (1999) identifies three general meanings of the term 
“diaspora” as it has been used in recent scholarship produced by 
many disciplines and about many groups. He discusses diasporas 
– and especially south Asian religious diasporas – as social forms, 
as types of consciousness, and as modes of cultural production. 
He points to changes in the meanings, relationships, and practice 
of religion and culture as diasporas experiment with disassociat-
ing them from each other; the differences between syncretic and 
hybrid identities, on the one hand, and multicultural competence, 
on the other; and the shifting relationship between structure and 
agency in diaspora. Östen Wahlbeck (2002) has added a fourth 
type “diaspora of politics”, which emphasises the political dimen-
sions of contemporary diasporas [Herzig 2006]. However, re-
cently any social group who has also maintained strong collective 
identities define themselves as a diaspora or a transnational com-
munity. Diasporic studies, however, fall short in their ability to 
explain the complex politics of migration and memory. Speaking 
of the manner in which the large Sikh diaspora related to the 
Khalistan movement in the Indian state of Punjab (in the 1980s 
and later as well), Axel states that given the memory (and 
images) of violence, the relation between the diaspora and the 
nation state are intertwined in a special relationship [Axel 2002: 
411-28]. In this relationship, the diverse Sikh bodies, religious 
practices, technologies of communication, state violence, myths 
of older national identity are all drawn together in order to com-
plicate the manner in which a diasporic community envisions its 
relationship with to the homeland, or place of origin. While the 
above-described migration from India and Pakistan to the Gulf is 
more recent, e g, Herzig (2006) shows that for more than a cen-
tury a substantial south Asian minority has been living in Kenya. 
Within a few decades a majority of the Kenyan Asian has managed 
to transform their living conditions from an impoverished rural 
background in south Asia to a globalised and economically suc-
cessful middle class in East Africa. This example of migration as 
an opportunity of social mobility raises questions for how long 
south Asian migrants remain remitters only or start to settle in 
their countries of work. 
Both approaches, i e, diaspora and transnational migration do 
not analyse relations of migrants to their places of origin or rela-
tions to their new places of residence and work. They are equally 
blind towards inequalities and unequal power relations between 
and within households, communities and beyond. In most 
studies, migrants are perceived as one united group, imposing 
an ideal picture of ethnic and familial bonds, and celebrating the 
importance of social networks. The south Asian reality of peo-
ple’s mobility we have tried to capture above, in contrast, dis-
plays enormous heterogeneity of migrants motives. The role of 
gender and caste-related power differentials in migration proc-
esses, for instance, cannot be ignored in the south Asian context.
What is more, the transnational approach stresses the impor-
tance of crossing international borders [Vertovec 1999; Conway 
2000], whereas migration processes may be internal as well. The 
focus on the “nation” implies that a “society” or “nation” can be 
perceived as a single unit. It implies that a society shares the same 
living conditions and has other things in common and that state 
borders are firm boundaries that separate very different worlds 
from each other. What the approach ignores is that social life 
only accepts administrative borders in a political and admini-
strative sense [Becker 2002; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002; 
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van Schendel 2002, 2005]. As shown above, regions like south 
Asia provide interesting examples of how borders are changing 
and how different migrants perceive international borders differ-
ently. Recent studies in India show that over 98 million people 
migrated from one place to another within the country in the 
1990s [Varma 2007]. Apart for women moving due to marriage, 
employment is the major reason why people move. The search for 
jobs, according to the same study, is more likely to be within the 
same federal state in India, rather than to another state. 
Additionally, the focus on transnational border movements 
within the transnational migration approach does not pay suffi-
cient attention to the range of types of mobility that are available 
to and necessary for individuals and families to be able to sustain 
their livelihoods. It ignores internal migration, which is firstly an 
important way of getting incomeand secondly often interlinked 
with international migration, as we described for the case of 
Kerala. Furthermore, many migrants migrate step by step. Either 
they migrate internally to the capital and later to another country 
or people migrate internationally and, if they have earned enough 
money, they will later invest in other parts of their country, both 
urban and rural. The categories of internal and international 
migration have become strongly interlinked, suggesting that 
moving from one country to another is only one dimension of 
creating new social spaces. We argue that migration approaches 
are obsessed by the nation state and international migration, 
and exclude the complexity of migration patterns where 
internal and international migration are often interlinked 
[Herzig and Thieme 2007].
Another dimension of mobility is that people are forced to mi-
grate due to conflicts or development projects. Here, official and 
administrative categories such as forced and voluntary migration 
are blurred. A case at hand is the recent displacement of more 
than a thousand people, first displaced from their homes due to 
ethnic conflicts in western Assam in the 1990s; displaced for a 
second time from their camps due to development projects in 
2007 [Das and Ahmed 2007]. The displaced persons had spent 
the interim decade in camps from where their only option was to 
leave to distant places like Lucknow and Delhi in search of work. 
Every time the migrants got wind of the Assam administration’s 
plans to relocate their camps, they made the arduous journey 
back to retain their status as displaced persons in Assam [Malkki 
1992: 24-44]. Regardless of such changes, people’s territorial at-
tachments and ties to “home” remain, or at times are transformed 
into a sense of longing and powerlessness. The example also 
illustrates how the two, three or more locales that make up the 
multi-local network are influenced by the flow of people, infor-
mation and financial resources, and also by social structures 
of the past.
Bourdieu’s theory of practice, applied to processes of migra-
tion, may address several of these shortcomings. Here, migrants 
do not receive a theoretical preferential treatment [Bourdieu 
1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992]. Their situation is analysed 
with the same concepts as the situation of all other members of 
society. It sheds light on explanations of how and why migrants 
and their non-migrating family members can benefit from migra-
tion, and what sometimes also prevents them from doing so and 
at the same time shows the interlinkages between places of origin 
and places of residence and work [Thieme 2006]. 
Following Bourdieu, the social practice of migration can be 
seen as a result of interrelation between habitus and social field, 
where habitus is a system of lasting positions and an internalised 
behaviour, a product of history and a social field is something 
that is constituted by positions of actors and the relationship 
between them. Relevant actors in the field of migrant labour may 
be indigenous people and new settlers, wife and husband in a 
household, employee and employer in the job market. The rela-
tions between these positions constitute a social topography in 
which some of these actors are more powerful than others. The 
position of an actor in a social field is based on the possession and 
amount of various capitals. Their significance varies depending 
on the respective field [Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992]. This forces 
to include the structural context in the analysis and does not al-
low to stop the investigation once an actor’s capital endowment is 
listed, as often done in livelihoods approaches. For instance, 
rather than education, access to the “job-selling” migrant net-
works in Delhi may be a crucial resource for newly arriving Nepa-
lis. Opportunities and constraints related to migration are thus 
socially embedded and reflect power imbalances and roles as-
cribed to gender, age, ethnicity, caste and wealth. In Bourdieu’s 
terms, these roles become symbolic capital predetermining ac-
cess to and use of certain resources, capacities and strategies of 
peoples’ ability to negotiate and decide who gets to migrate. The 
capitals actors are endowed with are used to produce and repro-
duce power structures as illustrated by the discourse regarding 
female migration/trafficking from Nepal. 
Clearly, networks between non-governmental organisations 
and security forces are utilised in the field of labour migration 
to defend a conservative gender order that denies women’s 
agency. Whereas Bourdieu’s main focus of attention is on the 
reproduction of power hierarchies, the theory of practice, also 
allows us to look at changing power relations among migrating 
and non-migrating household members or the individual and 
its community. People who are affected by migration, be it in 
the receiving regions, or migrants and non-migrating family 
members in a multi-local household, need to renegotiate their 
positions and needs in the new social field, opening up new op-
portunities and also reinforcing or creating new power imbal-
ances and conflicts. Leaving the caste stratified field of Tamil 
Nadu for mobile ironing in Kerala, for instance, has helped mi-
grants to escape caste-based domination. The establishment of 
informal savings and credit associations through Nepali migrants 
can be seen as an act of capitalising on social networks to 
empower themselves financially. 
conclusions
Remittances are welcomed by national governments, while re-
mitters are often ignored in interventions, or – worse – their 
moves are restricted, their livelihoods unprotected, and they 
themselves harassed by authorities. At the international level, 
the standstill in the negotiations regarding the so-called mode 4 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) indicate that free movement of 
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labour(ers) represents a blind spot in global market liberalisation.7 
South Asian governments have pushed for more and better com-
mitments of WTO members for the movement of service provid-
ing persons but face fierce resistance of industrial countries. 
The dignity of migrants and their contribution to the economy 
have to be appreciated by societies and national governments in 
south Asia. However, that is easier said that done, since following 
the formation of modern states in the 20th century, mobile peo-
ple and communities have been subjected to all forms of indig-
nity and injustice by governments and receiving societies. Search 
for livelihoods has been a common thread in south Asian history. 
It has created hybrid cultures, led to flourishing trade and com-
merce and created empires. Search for livelihoods have also led 
to innumerable stories of loss, violence and tragedies. However, 
the effort to quantify the economic contributions of migrants to 
south Asian societies is a more recent phenomenon. Such efforts 
need to be calibrated by nuanced grasp of what constitutes the 
lives of migrants and where they look towards for support.
We critiqued a missing migration and livelihoods approaches as a 
link to other existing social theory and a missing consideration of 
the importance of place and identity. The reasons behind migra-
tion, as well as the opportunities for and restrictions on it, are 
socially embedded and reflect power imbalances and roles re-
lated to gender, age, ethnicity and caste. These roles and power 
imbalances that stratify households, communities as well as na-
tional and global societies determine how much access and use of 
certain resources people have, the capacities and strategies of ne-
gotiation and decision-making they have, as well as who migrates 
and who does not. Migration and the resulting multi-locality of 
livelihoods are driving forces to challenge power imbalances. 
However, migration and multi-locality do not always generate 
greater equality but can also produce inequality and exclusion 
and do not therefore necessarily provide human security. To 
achieve this goal, interventions at national and international lev-
els are required. On the one hand, they should aim at reducing 
threats to human security, such as poverty, marginalisation and 
conflict that trigger migration flows. On the other hand, migra-
tion processes should be transparent and non-discriminatory and 
national and international law should protect migrants living 
and working conditions.
Notes
 1 Translated: “Let us march to Darrang, clear the 
jungle, make it rich and occupy the fallow land”. 
Darrang was a popular district for settlers in early 
20th century Assam. Cf Alaka Sarmah, 1999, Im-
migration and Assam Politics, Ajanta Books Inter-
national, Delhi, p 8.
 2 In 2004, this figure was $ 325 million (23.7 billion 
NRs).
 3 This concern is widespread among non-state ac-
tors in south Asia. We wish to cite two examples 
of such concerns in the region. The National Hu-
man Rights Commission in Nepal mentions in 
its report of 2005 that trafficking of women and 
children along its long and porous border of India 
is a cause for concern. It also states that non-
governmental organisations have been asked to 
help with detection and interception of sup-
posed victims of trafficking along select border 
points. Migration rights activists argue that 
such measures go against notions of agency and 
curbs livelihood options of mobile populations. 
In another example, the All Assam Students Union 
has been in the forefront in the demand to seal 
the border between India and Bangladesh as it 
claims that there are daily incursions of illegal 
immigrants from Bangladesh into India’s north-
eastern states like Assam. In response to such 
demands, the government of India often rounded 
up “suspected” Bangladeshi migrants and in con-
travention to domestic and international laws, 
forced them into the no-man’s-land between the 
two countries.
 4 A journalist visiting the border of India and Bang-
ladesh in Tripura spoke of how the security forces 
pitied the tribal people who did not “know what 
the border meant”. A Border Security Force (BSF) 
official told the journalist that earlier, tribal wom-
en would argue with the Indian officials when 
they were stopped from crossing over to Bangla-
desh to see their families. “Now, with the fence”, 
the official said, “they have a sense of where their 
country ends and the other country begins”. The 
official obviously ignored to fact that the border 
had surgically divided the tribal hamlets, territo-
ry and peoples (personal correspondence with 
Sanjay Barbora, Guwahati, April 30, 2007).
 5 In the late 1990s, the Supreme Court of India 
issued an order asking the government of India 
to confer citizenship rights to the Chakmas of 
Arunachal Pradesh. This created a furore among 
the indigenous tribes of Arunachal Pradesh who 
claimed that according citizenship status to the 
Chakmas would dilute the protective discrimi-
nation regime of the indigenous peoples of the 
federal unit. 
 6 Sanjay Barbora’s personal interview with Renu 
Rajbhandari (chairperson, WOREC, Nepal) and 
Padma Mathema (National Rapporteur on Traf-
ficking, Nepal); January 18-19, 2007, New Delhi. 
The latter insisted that there was nothing to sub-
stantiate notions of “safe migration” for women 
who are trapped in the trafficking routes, while 
the former highlighted the fact that anti-traffick-
ing laws have restricted the movement of women 
and as such were discriminatory.
 7 “Mode 4” denotes the movement of individual 
service providers.
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